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Abstract. In this paper, we study an E0-like combiner with memory
as the keystream generator. First, we formulate a systematic and sim-
ple method to compute correlations of the FSM output sequences (up to
certain bits). An upper bound of the correlations is given, which is useful
to the designer. Second, we show how to build either a uni-bias-based or
multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the keystream produced by
the combiner from a truly random sequence, once correlations are found.
The data complexity of both distinguishers is carefully analyzed for per-
formance comparison. We show that the multi-bias-based distinguisher
outperforms the uni-bias-based distinguisher only when the patterns of
the largest biases are linearly dependent. The keystream distinguisher is
then upgraded for use in the key-recovery attack. The latter actually re-
duces to the well-known Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) problem
given the keystream long enough. We devise an algorithm based on Fast
Walsh Transform (FWT) to solve the MLD problem for any linear code
with dimension L and length n within time O(n + L · 2L). Meanwhile,
we summarize a design criterion for our E0-like combiner with memory
to resist the proposed attacks.
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1 Introduction
To protect confidentiality, stream ciphers are often used in the constrained
environment (e.g. high speed, minimal area, limited power supply, low
power consumption). For this reason, wireless encryption often uses stream
ciphers (e.g. A5/1 in GSM, E0 in Bluetooth, RC4 in WEP).
Many stream ciphers are based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers
(i.e. LFSRs [41]). They use different mechanisms such as the irregular
clocking, the nonlinear combination function or the nonlinear filtering
function to destroy the fatally weak property of LFSRs: linearity. We call
them by clock-controlled generators, nonlinear combiners and nonlinear
filter generators respectively.
As one of the mainstream attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers,
correlation attack was first introduced by Siegenthaler [50] to attack the
nonlinear combiners. The basic idea is to “divide and conquer” when the
keystream output is correlated to the individual LFSR output sequence
due to the poor choice of the combining function. That is, instead of
the naive exhaustive search on all possible combinations of the initial
states of the component LFSRs, we only perform an exhaustive search
for the initial state of each individual LFSR independently and test the
correlation between each LFSR output sequence and the keystream. The
optimum (deterministic) Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) strategy
yields the answer for the initial state of the LFSR. This idea can be applied
to attack nonlinear filter generators (e.g. [20, 23, 47, 51]).
Apparently, the time complexity of the basic correlation attack [50]
grows exponential in the length of the LFSR, which is impractical for a
long LFSR. As a matter of fact, in coding theory, the MLD problem for
linear codes, according to [5], was shown to be NP-complete (see [21] for
definition). The focus of cryptographers has been on the general problem
where the individual LFSR may be arbitrarily long. In order to speed
up the attack for the general setting, Meier and Staffelbach [38, 39] used
the probabilistic iterative decoding strategy to refine the basic correla-
tion attack into a so-called “fast correlation attack” to reconstruct each
individual LFSR. A critical factor for the efficiency of the fast correla-
tion attack is the novel use of the multiple polynomial of the LFSR’s
feedback polynomial with low weight (and low degree). This fast corre-
lation attack of [38, 39] was improved by a series of variant fast correla-
tion attacks (e.g. [10,13,44–46,55]). Recently, various (still probabilistic)
decoding techniques have proved very successful to further improve the
performance of the fast correlation attack (e.g. [8,9,11,12,27–29,42,43]).
As a new emerging short-range wireless radio standard with low power
consumption, Bluetooth [6] uses the stream cipher E0. It is a combiner
with memory and actually a variant of the summation generator [48]. In
this paper, we propose an E0-like combiner with memory as the stream
cipher. A systematic computation method is formulated to calculate cor-
relations of the FSM output sequences (up to certain bits) by a recursive
expression. Furthermore, we give an upper bound of the correlations,
which is useful to the designer. Prior to our work, correlation properties
of combiners with one-bit memory, and with m-bit memory were studied
in [40], and [22] respectively. As they considered correlations of a gen-
eral form, the length of the correlation pattern is restricted to be rather
small for the analysis. By comparison, as we restrict ourselves to a spe-
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cial class of correlations (i.e. correlations of the FSM output sequence),
we are able to investigate those correlations with the sequence length of
much a wider range. This is quite an important result, since the search of
a correlation as large as possible constitutes one of the crucial tasks for
efficient correlation attacks on LFSR-based stream ciphers.
When correlations are found, we can build either a uni-bias-based
or multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the keystream produced
by the combiner from a truly random sequence. We apply the concept of
convolution to the data complexity analysis of the multi-bias-based distin-
guisher that uses all the correlations. Based on the theory of [4], we show
that the multi-bias-based distinguisher outperforms the uni-bias-based
distinguisher only when the patterns of the largest biases are linearly
dependent.
The keystream distinguisher not only enables the keystream distin-
guishing attack, but also can upgrade into the key-recovery attack to
reconstruct the initial states of the LFSRs. The latter actually reduces
to the well-known MLD problem given the keystream long enough (or
the bias large enough). By means of Fast Walsh Transform (FWT), we
devise an algorithm to solve the MLD problem for any linear code with
dimension L and length n within time O(n+L · 2L). It is the best deter-
ministic decoding algorithm known so far. Interestingly, an FWT-based
algorithm was proposed in another context to speed up other kinds of
fast correlation attacks [12].
Finally, the analysis principle is successfully applied to the core of
Bluetooth encryption algorithm E0. Our key-recovery attack reconstructs
the initial states of the LFSRs in time 239 given 239 consecutive keystream
bits after O(237) precomputation3. This is the best academic key-recovery
attack against the core E0 compared with all the attacks [1, 2, 14, 16–19,
24–26,30,49] on the core E0. Considering a maximal keystream length of
2745 bits for E0 used in Bluetooth, the attack is impractical. Nonetheless,
the resynchronization flaw of E0 (see [34]) enables us to deduce non-trivial
correlations of full E0 from those of the core E0; this finally leads to the
fastest (and only) practical known-plaintext attack on full E0 in 2005
(see [33]).
As part of the thesis [32], this paper extends the results of [35] with
a more general approach, and summarizes a design criterion for our E0-
like combiner with memory to resist the proposed attacks. The rest of
the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give the mathematical
3 Throughout this paper, O(·) is used to provide a rough estimate on complexities,
e.g., O(237) here means c · 237 operations, where c is a small constant.
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model of our E0-like combiner with memory. Then we study the correla-
tion properties of the FSM output sequence in Section 3. The correlation
properties enables to mount the distinguishing attack on our combiner in
Section 4; we first build a uni-bias-based distinguisher and then a multi-
bias-based distinguisher, and performance comparison between the two
is also analyzed. In Section 5, we study the key-recovery attack based on
our former distinguishing attacks; we show that the key-recovery attack
reduces to the MLD problem. In Section 6 we investigate the MLD al-
gorithm for a linear code. We conduct a case study on the core E0 in
Section 7. Finally, we give conclusions in Section 8.
2 Mathematical Model
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Fig. 1. The core stream cipher
Our model of the E0-like combiner with memory is depicted in Fig. 1.
It belongs to the LFSR-based combiner (with or without memory). To
briefly outline, the keystream generator consists of n maximum-length
LFSRs denoted by R1, . . . , Rn. Let the Ri have pairwise distinct lengths
Li (for convenience, let L1 < L2 < · · · < Ln) and primitive characteristic
polynomials pi(x). Besides, the combination generator has a Finite State
Machine (FSM) of k memory bits. Denote the k-bit state at time t by
σt = (σ
k−1
t , . . . , σ
0
t ). We denote λt hereafter the content of LFSRs at time
t. Then the state of the combiner at time t is fully represented by the
(L+ k)-bit pair (λt, σt), where L =
∑n
i=1 Li.
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At each clock cycle t, the LFSRs output bits xt = (x
1
t , x
2
t , . . . , x
n
t )
serve as the input to the FSM. Its next state σt+1 can be expressed by a
nonlinear function F of its current state σt and xt, i.e.
σt+1 = F(xt, σt). (1)
The FSM emits one bit
ψt = $ · σt, (2)
which is an inner product4 of its current state σt and the constant $ ∈
GF (2)k. Finally, the combiner generates one bit zt of keystream, which is
obtained by xoring one FSM output bit ψt together with the sum of the
LFSRs outputs, that is,
ξt ⊕ ψt = zt, (3)
where ξt =
⊕n
i=1 x
i
t.
Lemma 1. Assuming that σt 7→ σt+1 is a permutation for any xt, if σ0
is random and uniformly distributed, then, σt is random and uniformly
distributed for any t. If λ0 is random and uniformly distributed, then, λt
is random and uniformly distributed for any t. If (λ0, σ0) is random and
uniformly distributed, the L1-tuple (σ0, σ1, . . . , σL1−1) is independent of
xL1−1.
Proof. Noticing that λt 7→ λt+1 is a permutation, by induction, we know
that λ0 7→ λt is a permutation for any t. Similarly, we deduce that σ0 7→ σt
is a permutation for any t.
To prove the remaining part of the lemma, as x0, . . . , xL1−1 are con-
tained in λ0, we know that L1 − 1 consecutive vectors x0, . . . , xL1−2 are
i.i.d. random variables all independent of both σ0 and xL1−1 assuming
that (λ0, σ0) is random and uniformly distributed. From this statement
we apply Eq.(1) consecutively for t = 0, . . . , L1−2 and deduce that the L1-
tuple (σ0, σ1, . . . , σL1−1) is independent of xL1−1 assuming that (λ0, σ0)
is random and uniformly distributed.

Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to F that satisfies σt 7→
σt+1 is a permutation for any xt.
4 An inner product between two `-bit binary vectors x = (x1, . . . , x`) and y =
(y1, . . . , y`) is defined by x · y
def
= x1y1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ x`y`.
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3 Correlation Properties
Definition 2. The bias of a random Boolean variable X is defined as
∆(X)
def
= Pr(X = 0)− Pr(X = 1) = E[(−1)X ].
The correlation between two random Boolean variables X and Y is∆(X⊕
Y ). Assuming that (x0, σ0) is a uniformly distributed random vector of
(n + k) bits, we know that given a, b ∈ GF (2)k , ∆(a · σ1 ⊕ b · σ0) is a
fixed value, which can be computed as follows. For all possible (x0, σ0),
we use Eq.(1) to compute σ1; thus, we can collect all possible (σ0, σ1) and
calculate ∆(a · σ1⊕ b · σ0) by Definition 2. The following lemma, inspired
by [26], gives an easy way to compute the bias for iterative structures.
Lemma 3. Given a set E and Θ : E × GF (2)k → GF (2) and Λ :
GF (2) → GF (2)k, let X and Y be two independent random variables in
E and GF (2) respectively. Assuming that Λ(Y ) is uniformly distributed
in GF (2)k, then, for any v ∈ GF (2), we have
∆ (Θ (X,Λ(Y ))⊕ v · Y ) =
∑
w∈GF (2)k
∆(Θ(X,Λ(Y ))⊕w · Λ(Y ))×
∆(w · Λ(Y )⊕ v · Y ).
Proof. Let Z = Λ(Y ). By our assumption, Z is a random variable indepen-
dent ofX with uniform distribution. We have ∆(Θ(X,Λ(Y ))⊕w·Λ(Y )) =
∆(Θ(X,Z)⊕w · Z) for any w ∈ GF (2)k . We rewrite the right-hand side
as follows:∑
w
∆(Θ(X,Z)⊕ w · Z) ·∆(w · Λ(Y )⊕ v · Y )
=
∑
w
E[(−1)Θ(X,Z)⊕w·Z ] · E[(−1)w·Λ(Y )⊕v·Y ]
=
∑
w
(∑
x,z
Pr(x, z) · (−1)Θ(X,Z)⊕w·Z
)
·
(∑
y
Pr(y) · (−1)w·Λ(Y )⊕v·Y
)
=
∑
x
∑
y
∑
z
∑
w
Pr(x, z) · Pr(y) · (−1)Θ(x,z)⊕v·y⊕w·(z⊕Λ(y)),
As the inner sum over w is zero for all z 6= Λ(y), we continue
2k ·
∑
x,y
Pr(X = x,Z = Λ(y)) · Pr(Y = y) · (−1)Θ(x,Λ(y))⊕v·y
=
∑
x,y
Pr(x, y) · (−1)Θ(x,Λ(y))⊕v·y
= E[(−1)Θ(X,Λ(Y ))⊕v·Y ],
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which is ∆(Θ(X,Λ(Y ))⊕ v · Y ). 
Now we introduce the general iterative computation method to cal-
culate the biases.
Theorem 4. Assuming that σt 7→ σt+1 is a permutation for any xt and
that (λ0, σ0) is uniformly distributed, for any  ≤ L1+1 and a, b, α1, . . . , α ∈
GF (2)k, we define
δ(α1, . . . , α)
def
= ∆(α1 · σt ⊕ · · · ⊕ α · σt+−1)
and the state transition matrix U = {Uab} where
Uab
def
= Pr(σt+1 = b|σt = a).
δ(α1, . . . , α) and Uab do not depend on t. Additionally, we have
δ(α1, . . . , α) =
1
2k
∑
w∈GF (2)k
Ûw,α · δ(α1, . . . , α−2, α−1 ⊕ w),
where Û is the Walsh transform of U .
Proof. We apply Lemma 3 with X = x−2, Y = (σ0, . . . , σ−2), Λ(Y ) =
σ−2, Θ(X,Λ(Y )) = α · F(x−2, σ−2) = α ·σ−1 and v = (α1, . . . , α−1).
Note that the assumption of Lemma 3 holds by Lemma 1, and that the
connection with Û comes from δ(a, b) = ∆(a · σ0 ⊕ b · σ1) = bUab2k . 
In order to state our result on the upper bound of the correlations
for the combiner’s FSM output sequence of short length, we recall a few
definitions from information theory (see [15]). The entropy H(X) of a
discrete random variable X with alphabet X is defined by
H(X)
def
= −
∑
x∈X
Pr(x) log2 Pr(x).
The binary entropy function h(p) for 0 < p < 1 is defined by
h(p)
def
= −p log2 p− (1− p) log2(1− p).
The conditional entropy H(Y |X) of Y given X is
H(Y |X) def=
∑
x∈X
Pr(x)H(Y |X = x).
The following results on their relationship are useful for us. For any two
random variables X,Y we always have H(X) ≥ H(X|Y ) with equality if
7
and only if X and Y are independent. Analogously, for any three random
variables X,Y and Z, we always have H(X|Z) − H(X|Y,Z) ≥ 0 with
equality if and only if X and Y are conditionally independent given Z.
Based on information theory, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. With the assumptions of Theorem 4, there exists a positive ρ
such that
H(ψ1|σ0) = h
(
1
2
+
ρ
2
)
,
and ρ only depends on the state transition matrix U .
Proof. We compute H(ψ1|σ0) by definition:
H(ψ1|σ0) =
∑
a
H(ψ1|σ0 = a) · Pr(σ0 = a)
= E
a
[
h
(
1
2
+
1
2
∑
b:$·b=1
Uab − 1
2
∑
b:$·b=0
Uab
)]
. (4)
So there exists such a unique ρ ≥ 0 to satisfy the equation in Lemma 5,
that is,
h
(
1
2
+
ρ
2
)
= E
a
[
h
(
1
2
+
1
2
∑
b:$·b=1
Uab − 1
2
∑
b:$·b=0
Uab
)]
, (5)
and from Eq.(5) we know that ρ depends on U only. 
Note that Eq.(5) tells that if |∑b:$·b=1 Uab −∑b:$·b=0 Uab| is a con-
stant ρ0 for all a, then, ρ = ρ0. In particular, ρ = 0 if and only if∑
b:$·b=1 Uab ≡
∑
b:$·b=0 Uab, i.e. Pr(ψ1 = 1|σ0 = a) = Pr(ψ1 = 0|σ0 =
a) = 12 , for all a. Equivalently, ρ = 0 if and only if H(ψ1|σ0) = 1, that
is, ρ = 0 if and only if $ · F(x0, σ0) and σ0 are independent assuming
(x0, σ0) is uniformly distributed.
From Lemma 5, we can prove the upper bound of the correlations for
the combiner’s FSM output sequence of short length.
Theorem 6. For any  ≤ L1 + 1 and any binary α1, . . . , α−1, let the
-bit vectors α = (α1, . . . , α−1, 1) and Ψ = (ψ0, . . . , ψ−1). With the as-
sumptions of Theorem 4, we have
|∆(α · Ψ)| ≤ ρ,
where ρ is defined in Eq.(5).
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Proof. First, by the property of the relation between the entropy and the
conditional entropy, we deduce that
H(α · Ψ) ≥ H(α · Ψ |σ0, . . . , σ−2) = H(ψ−1|σ0, . . . , σ−2). (6)
According to the property of the conditional entropy, we have
H(ψ−1|σ−2)−H(ψ−1|σ0, . . . , σ−2) ≥ 0
with equality if and only if ψ−1 and (σ−3, . . . , σ0) are conditionally in-
dependent given σ−2, which is valid here by the precondition  ≤ L1 + 1
and Lemma 1. Thus, we have
H(ψ−1|σ−2) = H(ψ−1|σ0, . . . , σ−2) (7)
Combining Eq.(6) and Eq.(7), we get H(α·Ψ) ≥ H(ψ−1|σ−2) = h(12 + ρ2 ).
Because h(p) is symmetric in p = 12 with the maximum at p =
1
2 , this is
equivalent to
1
2
− ρ
2
≤ Pr(α · Ψ = 0) ≤ 1
2
+
ρ
2
, (8)
Finally, we verify
|∆(α · Ψ)| = |Pr(α · Ψ = 0)− Pr(α · Ψ 6= 0)|
= |2 · Pr(α · Ψ = 0)− 1|. (9)
Putting Eq.(8) and Eq.(9) together we complete our proof. 
Remark 7. This theorem tells that the basic FSM design principle should
satisfy H(ψ1|σ0) = 1 to avoid the bias, which enables the keystream
distinguishing attack and key-recovery attack as detailed in the rest of
the paper.
Notice that the only purpose of the restriction on the dimension of α
(i.e.  ≤ L1+1), is to ensure validity of U being the state transition matrix.
In other words, if we loose this requirement by supposing U is always
the state transition matrix5, we still obtain the same upper bound ρ for
|∆(α · Ψ)|. Though it is not known yet which tuple(s) α makes |∆(α · Ψ)|
the maximum from Theorem 6, one thing is certain6: once H(ψ1|σ0) = 1,
no correlation exists for sequences of bitlength up to L1 + 1.
Prior to our work, correlation properties of combiners with one-bit
memory, and with m-bit memory were studied in [40], and [22] respec-
tively. As they considered correlations of a general form (i.e. correlation
5 This is a (weak) common assumption in cryptanalysis.
6 This result was published recently by an independent work [3] with different proof.
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between any linear function of the sequence {ξt} of  bits and any linear
function of the keystream {zt} of  bits),  is restricted to be rather small
for the analysis. In our work, we restrict ourselves to a special class of
correlations—correlations of the FSM output sequence (i.e. correlations
of any linear function of the sequence {ξt ⊕ zt} of  bits). This allows
to investigate those correlations for the sequence length  ≤ L1 + 1 with
much a wider range7.
4 The Keystream Distinguisher
4.1 The Equivalent Single LFSR
Let θi be the order of the characteristic polynomial pi(x) of Ri, for
i = 1, . . . , n. Since all pi(x) are primitive polynomials, θi = 2
Li − 1;
furthermore, by Lemma 6.57 of [31, p.218], the equivalent LFSR which
generates the same sequence {ξt} as the sum of the n original LFSR
outputs over GF (2) has the characteristic polynomial p(x) =
∏n
i=1 pi(x)
with order θ = lcm(θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) (by Lemma 6.50, [31, p.214]) and degree
L =
∑n
i=1 Li.
4.2 Finding the Multiple Polynomial with Low Weight
Let L be the degree of a general polynomial p(x) with order θ. We use
the standard approximation8 to estimate the minimal weight wd of mul-
tiples of p(x) with degree at most d by the following constraint: wd is the
smallest w such that
1
2L
×
(
d
w − 1
)
≥ 1. (10)
Listed in Table 1 is the estimated9 wd corresponding to d with L = 128
by solving Inequality (10).
To find multiples with minimum weight, Canteaut and Chabaud [7]
proposed an efficient algorithm for a not too large degree d (e.g. less than
211). Here, we are interested in the case with very large d  211. So we
7 For instance, in the core of E0 (described in Section 7.1 later), according to [24], the
sequence length  ≤ 6 by analysis of [22] for general correlations; in contrast, for the
special class of correlations in our work the sequence length  ≤ 27 (see Section 7.2).
8 Note that this approximation of (10) is valid for typical settings in cryptography.
However, it may not hold for some special cases (e.g. some of the products of two
primitive polynomials with the same degree do not have any multiple polynomial of
weight 3).
9 One special case occurs for d = θ because we know the exact value of wd.
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can use the conventional birthday paradox to find Q(x) with the minimal
d (i.e. w = wd), which takes precomputation time PT ≈ O(dd
w−1
2
e);
alternatively, we can use the generalized birthday problem to find Q(x) of
same weight but higher degree with much less precomputation as tradeoff
(see [53] for detail). Table 2 compares the two algorithms. Note that unless
otherwise mentioned explicitly in the notations, throughout the paper, we
always use log(·) to represent the natural logarithm to the base of e, which
is omitted from the notations.
Table 1. The estimated minimal weight wd of multiples of p(x) with degree d and
order θ by (10), where L = 128
d 247 458 855 1749 2387 218 223 227 233 244 265 θ
wd ≈ 31 ≈ 24 ≈ 20 ≈ 17 ≈ 16 ≈ 9 ≈ 7 ≈ 6 ≈ 5 ≈ 4 ≈ 3 = 2
Table 2. Complexity PT of finding multiple of p(x) with degree d, weight w where
L = 128
birthday problem
with minimal d tradeoff
d 218 223 227 233 244 265 232 243
w 9 7 6 5 4 3 9 5
log2 PT 72 69 68 66 66 65 35 45
4.3 Building a Uni-bias-based Distinguisher
Let Q(x) =
∑w
i=1 x
qi be the normalized multiple of p(x) =
∏n
i=1 pi(x)
with degree d and weight w, where 0 = q1 < q2 < . . . < qw = d. Let
α be the -bit binary vector such that |γ| is maximal where γ = ∆(α ·
(ψt, . . . , ψt+−1)). As
⊕w
i=1 ξt0+qi = 0 holds for all t0, by Eq.(3), we deduce
that
w⊕
i=1
α · (zt0+qi , . . . , zt0+qi+−1) =
w⊕
i=1
α · (ψt0+qi, . . . , ψt0+qi+−1). (11)
With the heuristic assumption of independence, we know from the famous
Piling-up Lemma [37] that the right-hand side of Eq.(11) has a bias |γ|w
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(resp. −|γ|w) if γ is positive (resp. negative). With standard linear crypt-
analysis techniques, we can therefore distinguish the keystream {zt} from
a truly random sequence with a number of samples within the order of
magnitude of ζ = γ−2·w, simply by checking the left-hand side of Eq.(11)
equals zero (resp. one) most of the time with the positive (resp. negative)
γ. Based on Q(x) with d and w, we minimize the data complexity Ξ by
choosing Ξ = ζ + d = γ−2·w + d.
4.4 The Multi-bias-based Distinguisher
Preliminaries
Definition 8. Given f, g : GF (2)` → R, for a ∈ GF (2)`, we define
1. (f ⊗ g)(a) =
∑
b∈GF (2)`
f(b) · g(a⊕ b)
f⊗w(a) = (f ⊗ · · · ⊗ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
w times
)(a)
2. f̂(a) =
∑
b∈GF (2)`
(−1)a·bf(b)
3. ‖f‖ =
√ ∑
a∈GF (2)`
f2(a)
4. ∆(f) = 2
`
2 ·
∥∥∥∥f − 12` · 1
∥∥∥∥, where 1 denotes a constant function equal
to 1.
Note that the first two definitions correspond to convolution and Walsh
transform respectively. We recall these basic facts: for any f, g : GF (2)` →
R, we have
– f̂ ⊗ g(a) = f̂(a) · ĝ(a), for all a ∈ GF (2)`;
– 2`‖f‖2 = ‖f̂‖2;
– if f is a distribution, i.e.
∑
a f(a) = 1 and f(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ GF (2)`,
then the distribution of the XOR of w i.i.d. random vectors with
distribution f is f⊗w, moreover, ∆2(f) =
∑
a6=0 f̂
2(a);
– If the random Boolean variable A follows the distribution f , then
∆(f) = ∆(A), where ∆(A) is defined in Definition 2, Section 3.
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An Efficient Way to Deploy Multi-Biases Simultaneously We are
interested in the possibility of further improving the performance of the
distinguisher by using more than one bias simultaneously. To address this
problem, we introduce a linear mapping J : GF (2)ν → GF (2)` of rank `.
Our goal is to find a better J to lower the date complexity. Define `-bit
vectors
At = J(ψ`t, . . . , ψ`t+ν−1)
Bt =
w⊕
i=1
At+qi
Note that Bt can be derived from the keystream {zt} directly. Except for
accidentally bad choices of J , we make a heuristic assumption that all
At’s are independent. Let D be the probability distribution of the ν-bit
vector (ψ`t, . . . , ψ`t+ν−1), and let DA be the probability distribution of
the `-bit vector At. Note that DA and D are linked by
DA(b) =
∑
a∈GF (2)ν
D(a) · 1b=J(a)
for any b ∈ GF (2)`. Moreover, the Walsh transforms of DA and D are
also linked by
D̂A(b) = D̂
(
J>(b)
)
,
for all b ∈ GF (2)`. Now we discuss how to design J in order to reduce the
data complexity. From Baigne`res et al. [4], we know that we can distin-
guish a distribution f of `-bit random vectors from a uniform distribution
with 1/∆2(f) samples. Here, the distribution of Bt is f = D⊗wA . So the
modified distinguisher needs data complexity
Ξ =
`
∆2(D⊗wA )
+ d (bits).
Let µ be the number of nonzero b such that the Walsh coefficient D̂A(b)
has the largest absolute value10 (denoted by η). Since ∆2(D⊗wA ) ≈ µη2w,
we have Ξ ≈ `
µ
η−2w +d. In order to lower Ξ, it is necessary to have ` < µ.
This implies that only when the patterns of the µ largest coefficients are
linearly dependent, the multi-bias distinguisher is more efficient than the
uni-bias distinguisher; otherwise, the former is as efficient as the latter.
Note that Section 4.3 actually deals with the special type of distinguishers
with ` = µ = 1.
10 Note that from Theorem 4 we have η ≤ γ ≤ ρ for ν ≤ L1 + 1 regardless of ` and J ,
where ρ is defined in Eq.(5).
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5 The Key-recovery Attack
We use the same approach as in [16] to transform our keystream distin-
guisher of Section 4 into a key-recovery attack to reconstruct the shortest
LFSR (i.e. R1).
Now, let Q(x) =
∑w
i=1 x
qi be a multiple polynomial of
∏n
i=2 pi(x) with
degree d and weight w, which can be found by techniques in Section 4.2.
Let x˜1 be a guess for x1, the initial state of R1 which generates the
keystream {zt} together with the other n− 1 fixed LFSRs. Denote x˜1t the
output bit of R1 with the initial state x˜
1 at time t. We define
rt =
w⊕
i=1
α · (x˜1t+qi , . . . , x˜1t+qi+−1),
st =
w⊕
i=1
α · (zt+qi , . . . , zt+qi+−1),
for t = 0, . . . , ζ − 1 (corresponding to the data complexity Ξ = ζ + d).
It can be shown that {rt} is also an m-sequence generated by the same
LFSR. Let r be the initial state. Let bt(x˜
1)
def
= st⊕ rt for t = 0, . . . , ζ − 1.
Given ζ-bit sequence of bt(x˜
1)’s, we count the occurrences11 N(x˜1) of
ones, that is,
N(x˜1)
def
=
ζ−1∑
t=0
bt(x˜
1). (12)
Two cases of statistical characteristics arise. We use similar analysis [52]
for the case γ > 0, which can be easily adjusted for γ < 0.
Case One: x˜1 = x1. We have
bt(x˜
1) =
w⊕
i=1
α · (ψt+qi , . . . , ψt+qi+−1).
Recall from Section 4.3, we know that p
def
= Pr(bt(x˜
1) = 0) = 12 +
γw
2 ,
assuming independence of all α · (ψt+qi , . . . , ψt+qi+−1) for i = 1, . . . , w.
So N(x1) complies with the binomial distribution B(ζ; p). As convention,
when ζ is large and p is close to 12 , we approximate the binomial distribu-
tion of N(x1) by the normal distribution N (ζp,
√
ζ
4 ), where the standard
deviation is computed as
√
ζ · p(1− p) ≈
√
ζ
4 .
11 w is fixed in the attack, so we omit it in the notation N(x˜1).
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Case Two: x˜1 6= x1. We have∑
x˜1∈GF (2)L1
N(x˜1) = ζ · 2L1−1
for any fixed keystream {zt}. We immediately have
E
 ∑
x˜1 6=x1
N(x˜1)
 = ζ · 2L1−1 − ζ · p
for any fixed keystream {zt}. We deduce that the average of N(x˜1) over
all x˜1 6= x1 is
Ex˜1 6=x1 [N(x˜
1)] =
E
[∑
x˜1 6=x1 N(x˜
1)
]
2L1 − 1 =
ζ
2
− ζ(p−
1
2)
2L1 − 1 ≈
ζ
2
.
So N(x˜1) asymptotically complies with the binomial distribution B(ζ; 12).
Similarly as the former case, we approximate the binomial distribution
of N(x˜1) by the normal distribution N ( ζ2 ,
√
ζ
4 ), where the standard de-
viation is computed as
√
ζ · 12(1− 12) =
√
ζ
4 . Since we are interested in
the probability of success to distinguish the two distinct distributions, we
compute the probability of error Prerr as
Prerr
def
= Pr
(
N
(
x1
)
< N
(
x˜1
))
= Pr
(
N
(
x1
)−N (x˜1) < 0) .
Assuming independence of N(x1) and N(x˜1), we expect that N(x1) −
N(x˜1) asymptotically complies with the normal distributionN ( ζγw2 ,
√
ζ
2).
We have
Prerr ≈ Φ
− ζγw2√
ζ
2
 = Φ(−√2ζ
2
· γw
)
,
where Φ is the standard normal distribution. Thus we estimate the rank
of N(x1) among all N(x˜1) in ascending order by
E
[
RankN(x1)
]
= (2L1 − 1) · Prerr ≈ 2L1γw√piζ e−
ζ
4
γ2w . (13)
According to the conventional estimation [11, 27] in correlation attacks,
derived by channel coding theory, the critical data complexity ζ0, on the
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order of γ−2w, is ζ0 = L11−h( 1
2
+ 1
2
γw)
≈ 2L1 log 2
γ2w
, and h is the binary en-
tropy function. Note that this critical data complexity ζ0 does not guar-
antee that N(x1) is the smallest (resp. largest) of all N(x˜1) with positive
(resp. negative) γ. According to [11] simulations showed the probability
of success is closer to 12 for ζ = ζ0. Here, we are interested with a mini-
mum ζ such that the probability of success is closer to 1. Hence, we set
ζ = k0γ
−2w for some k0 to be determined by solving E[RankN(x1)] = 1 in
Formula (13). Finally, we obtain that the minimum
ζ ≈ 4L1 log 2
γ2w
(= 2ζ0) (14)
is needed to guarantee that N(x1) is the smallest (resp. largest) of all
N(x˜1) with positive (resp. negative) γ. Note that our analysis is consis-
tent with simulation results in [11], which showed that the probability of
success is close to 1 for ζ = 2ζ0. Clearly, our problem of recovering R1
right fits into the Maximum Likelihood Decoding (MLD) problem for a
general linear code, as described in Section 6. Thus, solving MLD problem
allows to recover r, after which we apply linear transform to solve x1.
6 A Maximum Likelihood Decoding Algorithm
We first recall the following basics of linear codes (see [36] for details).
Given a matrix GL×κ (with L < κ), for every message r = (r1, . . . , rL),
define the codeword x = (x1, . . . , xκ)
def
= rG. The set of all codewords
form the linear code, defined by G. The code is said to have dimension L,
length κ and generator matrix G. The MLD problem for the linear code
is: find the message r which minimizes the Hamming distance12 between
the associated codeword x and the received vector s = (s1, . . . , sκ), i.e.
find such r that minimizes N(r) =
∑κ
t=1(st ⊕ xt), where xt = rGt (Gt
denotes the t-th column vector of G).
For example, our preceding key-recovery attack in Section 5 can be
transformed into the MLD problem as follows. Define the column vector
Gt of the generator matrix G by Gt = (a0, . . . , aL1−1)>, where a0 +a1x+
· · ·+aL1−1xL1−1 = xt mod p1(x). And let L = L1, κ = ζ, r = r, x = {rt}
and s = {st}.
12 The Hamming distance between two vectors x = (x1, . . . , x`) and y = (y1, . . . , y`) of
equal dimension is the number of coordinates where they differ.
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6.1 The Time-domain Analysis
The trivial solution to find r is an exhaustive search in the time-domain:
for every message r˜, we compute N(r˜) and keep the smallest. The final
record leads to r. The time complexity is O(κ · 2L) with memory κ bits.
6.2 The Frequency-domain Analysis
We introduce an integer-valued function,
W(x) def=
∑
1≤t≤κ:Gt=x>
(−1)st ,
for all x ∈ GF (2)L, where > denotes the matrix transpose. We compute
the Walsh transform Ŵ of W as follows:
Ŵ(r) =
∑
x∈GF (2)L
(−1)r·xW(x)
=
κ∑
t=1
(−1)st⊕rGt
=
κ∑
t=1
(−1)st⊕xt
= κ− 2N(r).
We thereby reach the theorem below.
Theorem 9.
N(r) =
1
2
(
κ− Ŵ(r)
)
,
for all r ∈ GF (2)L.
This generalizes the result [36, p. 414] of a special case when κ = 2L
and G>t corresponds to the binary representation of t. So, to solve the
MLD problem, we just compute W, perform FWT (see [54]), and find
the maximum Ŵ(r) as shown in Algorithm 1.
The time and memory complexities of FWT are O(L · 2L), O(2L) re-
spectively. Since the precomputation of W takes time O(κ) with memory
O(κ), we conclude that the improved MLD algorithm runs in O(κ+L·2L)
with memory O(2L) (additionally, using linear transformation allows to
compute FWT over GF (2)k with memory O(2k) where k = dlog2 κe).
Note that when κ ≥ 2L, the time complexity corresponds to O(κ), which
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Algorithm 1 The frequency transformation algorithm
Inputs:
G = (G1, . . . , Gκ) : the generator matrix
keystream s1s2 · · · sκ
Preprocessing:
for all L-bit r do
compute W(r) and keep in memory
end for
Processing:
use FWT to compute cW
find r that achieves the maximal cW(r)
output r
is optimal in the sense that it stands on the same order of magnitude as
the data complexity does. Table 3 compares the original exhaustive search
algorithm with the improved frequency transformation algorithm. Note
that the technique of FWT was used in another context [12] to speed up
other kinds of fast correlation attacks. In the case of the core E0 (see
Section 7), we will see how it helps to speed up the attack [16] by a factor
of 224. We estimate similar correlation attacks like [11] can be speeded
up by a factor of 10; undoubtedly, some other attacks can be significantly
improved by our FWT-based algorithm as well.
Table 3. Comparison of maximum likelihood decoding algorithms
time memory
Exhaustive Search κ · 2L κ
Frequency Transformation κ + L · 2L min(κ, 2L)
6.3 A More Generalized MLD Algorithm
We further generalize the preceding problem by finding the L-bit vec-
tor r such that given a sequence of `-bit (` < L) vectors S1, . . . , Sτ
and f : GF (2)` → R together with matrices G1, . . . , Gτ of size L by
`, the sequence of `-bit vectors X1, . . . , Xτ defined by Xt = rGt mini-
mizes N(r) =
∑τ
t=1 f(St ⊕ Xt). It means the linear code has length τ`,
dimension L, and the generator matrix G = (G1, . . . , Gτ ). Note that our
previous problem in Section 6.2 is merely a special case of ` = 1, τ = κ
and f(a) = a for a ∈ GF (2).
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Define a real function
W(x) = 1
2`
∑
1≤t≤τ,a∈GF (2)`:aG>t =x
(−1)a·St f̂(a),
for all x ∈ GF (2)L. We compute the Walsh transform Ŵ of W as follows:
Ŵ(r) =
∑
x∈GF (2)L
(−1)r·xW(x)
=
1
2`
τ∑
t=1
∑
a∈GF (2)`
(−1)a·(rGt⊕St)f̂(a)
=
τ∑
t=1
f(rGt ⊕ St)
= N(r).
Algorithm 2 directly follows above computation. The total running time
of our algorithm is O(τ`L2` +L2L) with memory O(2L). To speed up the
computation of W, we could precompute the inner products of all pairs of
`-bit vectors in time O(22`) with memory O(22`). Thus, the total running
time of the algorithm is O(22` + τL2` +L2L) with memory O(22` + 2L).
Algorithm 2 The generalized MLD algorithm
Parameters:
f, `
Inputs:
G = (G1, . . . , Gτ ) : the generator matrix
vector stream S1, S2, · · · , Sτ
Processing:
apply FWT to compute the table of bf
initialize the table of W to 0
for all `-bit a do
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
increment W(aG>t ) by
1
2`
(−1)a·St bf (a)
end for
end for
use FWT to compute cW
find r that achieves the minimal cW(r)
output r
In the special case that Gt+1 = AGt for t = 1, . . . , τ , we precompute
another table to map any L-bit vector x to xA>. It takes time O(2L)
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with memory O(2L). The total time of the algorithm is thus O(22` +(L+
τ)2` + L2L), with memory O(22` + 2L). Note that above special case is
applicable to the core E0 (see Section 7).
6.4 Comments
According to [5], the general decoding problem for linear codes is shown to
be NP-complete (see [21] for definition) in the sense that the known deter-
ministic algorithm that decodes an arbitrary linear code with dimension
L and length κ performs an exhaustive trial on all possible codewords.
Thus, prior to us, the best deterministic decoding algorithm takes time
O(2L×κ). In our work, we showed that the decoding time O(L ·2L +κ) is
achievable and it grows linear in κ. This makes it possible now to decode
the linear code with not so large dimension but very large length in which
case the naive exhaustive decoding is infeasible.
7 Case Study: the Core of Bluetooth E0
7.1 Description
delay
FSM
R2
R3
R4
keystream zt
x1
t
x4
t
x3
t
x2
t
R1
F
c1
t
c0
t
c0
t−1 c
1
t−1
ξt
Fig. 2. Outline of the core E0
Specified in [6], the core keystream generator E0 (Fig. 2) used in
Bluetooth fits in the model in Section 2: n = 4, L1 = 25, L2 = 31, L3 = 33,
L4 = 39 (thus L = 128) with primitive characteristic polynomials
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p1(x) = x
25 + x17 + x13 + x5 + 1,
p2(x) = x
31 + x19 + x15 + x7 + 1,
p3(x) = x
33 + x29 + x9 + x5 + 1,
p4(x) = x
39 + x35 + x11 + x3 + 1,
respectively. The state σt of the FSM contains (ct−1, ct) of k bits, where
k = 4 and ct = (c
1
t , c
0
t ) has 2 bits. Let w(xt)
def
=
∑4
i=1 x
i
t be the Hamming
weight13 of xt. The FSM has the update function F : (w(xt), ct−1, ct) 7→
(ct, ct+1). Computing ct+1 from σt can be described by
c1t+1 = υ
1
t+1 ⊕ c1t ⊕ c0t−1,
c0t+1 = υ
0
t+1 ⊕ c0t ⊕ c1t−1 ⊕ c0t−1,
where the 2-bit υt+1 = (υ
1
t+1, υ
0
t+1) is defined by
υt+1 =
⌊
w(xt) + 2 · c1t + c0t
2
⌋
.
Table 4 shows the state transition of the FSM, where the four-bit state is
represented in the quaternary system (e.g. the FSM changes from σt = 13
into σt+1 = 32 by the input w(xt) = 2). One can check Table 4 by above
equations.
Table 4. State transition of σt+1 given w(xt) and σt
σt
00 01 02 03 10 11 12 13 20 21 22 23 30 31 32 33
0 00 11 23 32 03 12 20 31 01 10 22 33 02 13 21 30
1 00 10 23 31 03 13 20 32 01 11 22 30 02 12 21 33
w(xt) 2 01 10 20 31 02 13 23 32 00 11 21 30 03 12 22 33
3 01 13 20 30 02 10 23 33 00 12 21 31 03 11 22 32
4 02 13 21 30 01 10 22 33 03 12 20 31 00 11 23 32
With $ = 01 in Eq.(2), at each clock cycle t, the FSM emits one bit
ψt = c
0
t . The keystream output bit is zt = x
1
t ⊕ x2t ⊕ x3t ⊕ x4t ⊕ c0t .
7.2 Correlations
From Section 3, we know that if (λ0, σ0) is uniformly distributed, then,
for  ≤ 26 and any α1, . . . , α ∈ GF (2)4, δ(α1, . . . , α) = ∆(α1 · σt⊕ · · · ⊕
13 Recall that the Hamming weight of a vector is the number of 1’s of its coordinates.
Note that the Hamming weight of a vector always equals its Hamming distance
(defined in Section 6) to the all zero vector of equal dimension.
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α · σt+−1) is a constant and does not depend on t. It can be computed
by Theorem 4. However, notice that the core E0 has such a special FSM
that the two consecutive states σt and σt+1 are half overlapped (i.e. 2-bit
ct is contained in both). Therefore, to compute the value of ∆(α1 · σ0 ⊕
· · · ⊕ α · σ−1), the sequence α1, . . . , α is not unique. So, we resort to
another notation Ω for the unique expression of the same thing instead.
For  ≤ 27 and any a1, . . . , a ∈ GF (2)2, let Ω(a1, . . . , a) def= ∆(a1 ·
c0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a · c−1). Similarly to Theorem 4, we apply Lemma 3 with
X = x−2, Y = (c0, . . . , c−2), Λ(Y ) = (c−3, c−2), Θ(X,Λ(Y )) = a ·c−1
and v = (a1, . . . , a−1) and obtain the following result. Assuming (λ0, σ0)
is uniformly distributed, for any  ≤ 27 and a1, . . . , a ∈ GF (2)2, we have
Ω(a1, . . . , a) =
∑
w0,w1∈GF (2)2
Ω(w0, w1, a)×
Ω(a1, . . . , a−3, a−2 ⊕ w0, a−1 ⊕ w1).
Here is a full list of nonzero triplets:
Ω(0, 0, 0) = 1, Ω(1, 3, 2) = 14 , Ω(2, 3, 3) = − 58 ,
Ω(1, 0, 2) = 58 , Ω(2, 0, 3) =
1
4 , Ω(3, 3, 1) = − 14 .
With the list, we computed all -tuple biases for  ≤ 27 and found out that
the largest two biases are Ω(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = − 25256 and Ω(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) =
25
256 . Both biased were mentioned in [17, 24] without formal proof. Below
we give formal proof on the two biases.
Property 10. Assuming (λt, σt) is random and uniformly distributed, we
have
Pr(c0t ⊕ c0t+1 ⊕ c0t+2 ⊕ c0t+3 ⊕ c0t+4 = 1) =
1
2
+
25
512
.
Proof. We show the equivalent Ω(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = − 25256 as follows:
Ω(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = Ω(3, 3, 1) · Ω(1, 1, 1 ⊕ 3, 1 ⊕ 3)
= −1
4
Ω(1, 1, 2, 2)
= −1
4
∑
w0,w1
Ω(w0, w1, 2) · Ω(1, 1⊕ w0, 2⊕ w1)
= −1
4
(Ω(1, 0, 2)Ω(1, 1 ⊕ 1, 2) +Ω(1, 3, 2)Ω(1, 1 ⊕ 1, 2 ⊕ 3))
= −1
4
(
Ω2(1, 0, 2) +Ω(1, 3, 2)Ω(1, 0, 1)
)
= − 25
256
.
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Remark 11. Assuming w(xt) = 2 holds for t = t0, t0 + 1, t0 + 2, then,
regardless of the value of σt0 , we always have
c0t0 ⊕ c0t0+1 ⊕ c0t0+2 ⊕ c0t0+3 ⊕ c0t0+4 = 1.
Since Pr(w(xt) = 2) =
6
16 , this seems to suggest that
Pr(c0t ⊕ c0t+1 ⊕ c0t+2 ⊕ c0t+3 ⊕ c0t+4 = 1) ≈
1
2
+ (
6
16
)
3
=
1
2
+
27
512
,
which explains the bias in Property 10. This special case was not pointed
out in [17, 24] however.
Property 12. Assuming (λt, σt) is random and uniformly distributed, we
have
Pr(c0t = c
0
t+5) =
1
2
+
25
512
.
Proof. This bias is similarly proved from Ω(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) = 25256 . 
Throughout the rest of the paper, we let
γ = Ω(1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) = −Ω(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = 25
256
.
Besides the above two largest biases, we have the only second largest bias
up to 27 bits Ω(1, 0, 1, 1) = −2−4. This bias was already proved in [26].
Now, we apply Theorem 6 in Section 3 to compute the theoretical upper
bound of Ω(a) for any a of at most 27 tuples and compare γ with it. To
show this, we first list the state transition matrix U (where dashed entries
denote zeros) as follows.
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U =

5
16
10
16
1
16 − − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − 1016 116 − 516 − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − 1016 116 − 516 − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − 516 1016 116 −
− 116 1016 516 − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − 516 − 116 1016 − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − 516 − 116 1016 − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − − 116 1016 516
10
16
5
16 − 116 − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − 116 1016 516 − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − 116 1016 516 − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − 1016 516 − 116
1
16 − 516 1016 − − − − − − − − − − − −
− − − − − 516 1016 116 − − − − − − − −
− − − − − − − − − 516 1016 116 − − − −
− − − − − − − − − − − − 116 − 516 1016

From U , we notice that |∑b:$·b=1Uab−∑b:$·b=0Uab| remains a constant
ρ0 =
4
16 = 2
−2 for all a. Hence ρ = ρ0 = 2−2. Consequently, applying
Theorem 6, we know
|Ω(a)| ≤ 2−2,
for any a of at most 27 tuples. We check that γ ≈ 2−3.36 < 2−2.
7.3 Keystream Distinguishers
We are ready to build a distinguisher for the core E0 upon above largest
correlations together with the multiple Q(x) of
∏4
i=1 pi(x) with degree d
and weight w, which can be precomputed by birthday paradox as men-
tioned in Section 4.2 or easy manual calculation as follows:
Examples of Q(x) with Weight Four Recall that θi = 2
Li − 1 is the
order of pi(x) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. By definition, pi(x)|xθi + 1. On the other
hand, pi(x)pj(x)|lcm(xθi + 1, xθj + 1) = xlcm(θi,θj) + 1 for i 6= j, hence
we deduce the following three multiple polynomials of p(x) with weight 4
with ease:
Q1(x) = (x
lcm(θ1,θ2) + 1)(xlcm(θ3,θ4) + 1),
Q2(x) = (x
lcm(θ1,θ3) + 1)(xlcm(θ2,θ4) + 1),
Q3(x) = (x
lcm(θ1,θ4) + 1)(xlcm(θ2,θ3) + 1),
where
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lcm(θ1, θ2) = 2
56 − 231 − 225 + 1, lcm(θ1, θ3) = 258 − 233 − 225 + 1,
lcm(θ1, θ4) = 2
64 − 239 − 225 + 1, lcm(θ2, θ3) = 264 − 233 − 231 + 1,
lcm(θ2, θ4) = 2
70 − 239 − 231 + 1, lcm(θ3, θ4) = (239 − 1)
∑10
i=0 2
3i.
The degrees of Q1(x), Q2(x), Q3(x) are approximately 2
69, 270, 265 respec-
tively. Note that we may also expect optimal multiples with degree on the
same order of magnitude and weight 3 from Table 1.
Primary Distinguisher Table 5 summarizes the best performance of
our primary (uni-bias-based) distinguisher for the core E0 based on either
the use of Q3(x) with weight 4, or a search of Q(x), when we choose
α = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) or (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
Table 5. Summary of the best primary distinguisher for the core E0
type d w precomputation data time
use Q(x) = Q3(x) 2
65 4 - 265
find Q(x) minimal d 233 5 266 234
with tradeoff 243 5 245 243
Advanced Distinguisher From Section 4.4, we know that the multi-
bias-based distinguisher improves the uni-bias-based one only when the
patterns of the largest correlation coefficients are linearly dependent,
which happens to be true in the core E0: recall from Property 10 and
Property 12 that the 6-tuple patterns of the three largest biases satisfy
the linear relation,
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0) ⊕ (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
As a simple solution we may just pick ν = 6, ` = 2, J1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0)
and J2 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (where Ji is the i-th row of J), then we obtain
µ = 3. And the data complexity Ξ is reduced to a factor of 23 for neg-
ligible d. Indeed, recall that we proved by computation that the largest
Walsh coefficient for ν ≤ 27 are either (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) or
(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0). Thus µ ≤ (ν−4)+(ν−5) = 2ν−9. This
leads to a more general solution, if we pick ν = `+ 4, and the i-th row of
J as
Ji = ( 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1 zeros
, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
ν−i−4 zeros
) for i = 1, . . . , `, (15)
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then we obtain µ = 2` − 1. And so the improved factor `2`−1 of data
complexity Ξ tends to 12 for negligible d when ` goes to infinity; however,
because of the underlying assumption for the core E0, ν is restricted to
no larger than 27, i.e. ` ≤ 23. To conclude, we show that the modified
distinguisher (Algorithm 3) needs data complexity
Ξ ≈ `
2`− 1 · γ
−2w + d, for 1 ≤ ` ≤ 23. (16)
Table 6 shows the best improvement achieved with ` = 23. We see that
the minimum Ξ drops from previous 234 to 233.
Algorithm 3 The advanced distinguisher for the core E0
Parameters:
` ∈ [1, 23], ν = ` + 4
J : GF (2)ν → GF (2)` defined in (15)
DA: the probability distribution of the `-bit vector At
Q(x) =
Pw
i=1 x
qi : the multiple polynomial of p1(x)p2(x)p3(x)p4(x) with degree d
Ξ: the sample size by Eq.(16)
Inputs:
keystream z0z1 · · · zΞ−1 of either a truly random source S0 or the output S1 generated
by the core E0
initialize counters u0, u1, . . . , u2`−1
for t = 0, 1, . . . , bΞ−d−4
`
c − 1 do
compute b =
Lw
i=1 J(z`t+qi , · · · , z`t+qi+ν−1)
increment ub
end for
if
P
b
ub · log
`
2` · D⊗wA (b)
´
> 0 then
accept S1 as the source
else
accept S0 as the source
end if
Table 6. Data complexity Ξ of the advanced distinguisher for the core E0
d L 247 458 855 1749 2387 218 223 227 233 244 265 232 243
w 49 31 24 20 17 16 9 7 6 5 4 3 9 5
log2 Ξ 328 208 161 134 114 107 60 46 40 33 44 65 60 43
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7.4 The Key-recovery Attack
Here we consider the key-recovery attack of how to reconstruct the initial
states of the LFSRs for the core E0. Let Q(x) =
∑w
i=1 x
qi be the multiple
polynomial of
∏4
i=2 pi(x) with degree d and weight w. Q(x) can be found
with (precomputation) complexity PC by techniques in Section 4.2. Ta-
ble 7 lists the corresponding triplets (w, d, PC) for small w. As detailed
in Section 5, we use the MLD algorithm in Section 6.2 to recover x1.
Table 8 shows our estimated minimal ζ corresponding to w by Eq.(14).
Moreover, we conduct the same analysis as in Section 7.3 to decrease ζ
by a factor of `2`−1 for 1 ≤ ` ≤ 23; and we apply the technique introduced
in Section 6.3 to obtain the time complexity O(Ξ + θ1 · 2` + L1 · 2L1),
where Ξ = ζ + d. The attack complexities to recover R1 for the core E0
are listed in Table 9 for two best cases denoted by A and B, where we
choose ` = 12.
Table 7. Complexity PC of finding the multiple of p2(x)p3(x)p4(x) with degree d and
weight w
birthday problem
with minimal d tradeoff
weight w 5 4 3 2 5
degree d 227 236 252 2100 234.3
precomputation PC 254 254 252 - 236.3
Table 8. The estimated minimal ζ corresponding to w by Eq.(14) where L1 = 25,
γ = 25/256
w 5 4 3 2 1
ζ 240 233 227 220 214
Table 9. Summary of primary partial key-recovery attacks against R1 for the core E0
w d ζ data Ξ precomputation PT time memory
Attack A 5 234.3 239 239 236.3 239 225
Attack B 4 236 233 236 254 236 225
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Once we recover R1, we target R2 next based on multiple of p3(x)p4(x).
Last, we use the technique of guess and determine in [19] to solve R3 and
R4 with knowledge of the shortest two LFSRs. The detailed complexities
of each step are shown in Table 10. A comparison of our attacks with
the similar attack14 [16] and the best attacks [14,25] (both were algebraic
attacks) is shown in Table 11 for Case A and B.
Table 10. Detailed complexities of our key-recovery attack against the core E0
w d ζ data Ξ precomputation PT time memory
R1 5 2
34.3 239 239 236.3 239 225
R2 3 2
36 227 236 237 236 227
R3 and R4 - - - 76 - 2
33 -
total - - - 239 237 239 227
Table 11. Complexities comparison of our attacks with the similar attack [16] and the
best attacks [14, 25]
precomputation time data memory
Algebraic attack [14, 25] 237 249 223.4 237
Similar attack [16] 254 263 234 234
Our A 237 239 239 227
attacks B 254 237 236 227
Experimental Results with w = 1 We did the small-scale experiment
to verify our analysis in Section 5 on the keystream {⊕4i=2(xit ⊕ zt)}
instead of {zt} to save the trouble of searching the multiple Q(x) of∏4
i=2 pi(x) with low weight (herein w = 1). First, we test the rank of
N(x1) among those of all the 2L1 values of N(x˜1) (see Eq.(12) for def-
inition) for a total of 100 randomly chosen initial states of the core E0.
From Eq.(13), we have E[RankN(x1)] = 1 for ζ = 2
14. It turned out that
N(x1) ranks uniquely the top without exception.
Second, we choose some random x1, then compute the corresponding
average and variance of N(x˜
1)
ζ
over all x˜1 6= x1 individually, it turned out
14 The estimate of data complexity in [16] uses a different heuristic formula than ours.
However we believe that their estimate and ours in Attack B are essentially the
same.
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that Var(N(x˜
1)
ζ
) ≈ 1.526× 10−5, approximately the same as the expected
Var(N(x˜
1)
ζ
) = 1
ζ2
Var(N(x˜1)) = 14ζ = 2
−16 ≈ 1.526 × 10−5; and we got a
consistent average of 0.5. The left curve in Figure 3 corresponds to the
experimental probability distribution of N(x˜
1)
ζ
for x˜1 6= x1, where the
dotted line represents the central symmetric line.
Last, we accordingly tested the average and variance of N(x
1)
ζ
for 225
random initial states of the core E0. And we got the average of around
0.5488 with variance 2.121×10−5 (in contrast to the estimation of average
281
512 ≈ 0.5488, variance 2−16 ≈ 1.526×10−5 respectively). Its experimental
probability distribution is drawn on the right curve of Figure 3. It is worth
noticing that the two curves are indeed distinct.
0.46 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.54 0.56
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10−3
Fig. 3. The two distinct probability distributions of N(x˜
1)
ζ
for x˜1 6= x1 (left) and
x˜1 = x1 (right).
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose an E0-like combiner with memory as a keystream
generator. We formulate a systematic computation method to calculate
correlations of the FSM output sequences (up to certain bits) by a recur-
sive expression. In addition, we give a upper bound of the correlations,
which is useful to the designer. When correlations are found, we can build
either a uni-bias-based or multi-bias-based distinguisher to distinguish the
keystream produced by the combiner from a truly random sequence. We
apply the concept of convolution to the analysis of the multi-bias-based
distinguisher that uses all correlations. Based on the theory of [4], it is
shown that the multi-bias-based distinguisher outperforms the uni-bias-
based distinguisher only when the largest biases are linearly dependent.
The keystream distinguisher not only enables the keystream distinguish-
ing attack, but also can upgrade into the key-recovery attack to recon-
struct the initial states of the LFSRs. The latter actually reduces to the
well-known MLD problem given the keystream long enough (or the bias
large enough). By means of FWT, we devise an MLD algorithm to re-
cover the closest codeword for any linear code. It is the best deterministic
decoding algorithm known so far.
The analysis principle is successfully applied to the core of Bluetooth
encryption algorithm E0 completely. Our key-recovery attack reconstructs
the initial states of the LFSRs in 239 time given 239 consecutive keystream
bits after O(237) precomputation. This is the best academic key-recovery
attack against the core E0 compared with all the attacks [1, 2, 14, 16–19,
24–26,30,49] on the core E0. Considering a maximal keystream length of
2745 bits for E0 used in Bluetooth, the attack is impractical. Meanwhile,
our proposed MLD algorithm can be easily adapted to speed up a class
of fast correlation attacks.
All in all, an ideal nonlinear combiner with memory should satisfy
one necessary design principle: the FSM must generate no biased output
sequence, i.e.
H(ψ1|σ0) = 1.
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